This paper develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model of the financial system composed of ultimate borrowers, ultimate lenders and financial intermediaries. The model is used to investigate the impact of uncertainty about the likelihood of governmental bailouts on leverage, interest rates, the volume of defaults and the real economy. The distinction between risk and uncertainty is implemented by applying the maxmin with multiple priors framework to lenders' beliefs about the probability of bailout.
Introduction
Financial sector bailouts in the US and more recently in Europe have revived the well known dilemma between restoration of confidence in the face of a panic and the costs of moral hazard. On one hand, when a panic engulfs financial markets, bailouts appear indispensable in order to restore confidence and prevent further collapses in the financial system. On the other, by subsidizing opportunistic behavior at the expense of taxpayers, bailouts encourage excessive risk taking on the part of financial institutions, borrowers and lenders, and plant the seeds of the next bubble.
Different experts in both policymaking circles as well as in academia often find themselves at odds regarding the ways to handle this problem. In spite of currently ongoing reforms in regulation this dilemma is, therefore, likely to be a central issue during the upcoming decade. Whether, and how exactly will bailout policies be deployed in the future is largely an open issue. However, due to the lack of consensus about the precise ways to deal with the (exante and expost) trade-offs induced by bailouts, it is extremely likely that bailout uncertainty is likely to be non negligible in the foreseeable future. The 2008 bailout zigzags in the US (Bear-Stern versus Lehman) and current uncertainties about the reaction of EMU governments to sovereign debt problems in Greece, Cyprus and Spain attest to that. This paper develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model of the financial system and uses it in order to investigate the impact of an increase in bailout uncertainty on financial markets and the real economy. It also investigates the exante, leverage expanding, moral hazard problems created by perceived generous governmental bailout policies.
As is well known since Knight's (1921) work risk and uncertainty are distinct concepts. Modern formulations of this distinction in the context of pecuniary returns conceptualize risk as some measure of spread for a known distribution of the stochastic return. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is a situation in which individuals are unsure about the probability distribution of returns and entertain the possibility that several alternative probability distributions have positive measure. An increase in uncertainty is then viewed as a an enlargement of the set of plausible probability distributions with positive measure. Ellsberg (1961) and others have demonstrated by means of experiments that individuals are averse to ambiguity in the sense that, other things the same, they prefer a lottery with a known probability distribution to a lottery in which several distributions are believed to be possible. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) (GS in the sequel) conceptualize an investor's uncertainty by postulating that he possesses a subjective set of probability measures, or multiple priors, over outcomes.
1 Their framework implies that for each possible action the investor assumes that the worst (by the expected utility criterion) possible distribution will realize and chooses his action so as to attain maximum expected utility over this set of worst outcomes. This paper utilizes the GS notion of uncertainty and the associated max-min behavioral criterion to analyze the impact of an increase in uncertainty about governmental bailout policy on financial markets, the aggregate level of credit and, through them, on the real economy.
Prior to Lehman's collapse financial market's beliefs about the probability of bailout have been relatively optimistic due to Bear-Stern's bailout in March 2008 as well as to the implicit US government guarantees of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's liabilities (Meltzer (2009) ). In terms of the GS framework this means that the family of binomial bailout distributions with positive mass was concentrated in the relatively high range of bailout probabilities. After Lehman's collapse in mid September 2008 this range expanded downward toward bailout probabilities that previously were given zero mass.
2
The behavior of credit default swap (CDS) spreads during the two weeks following Lehman's collapse provides a dramatic illustration of the sensitivity of bailout perceptions to public signals.
In the aftermath of this collapse credit markets experienced substantial waves of deleveraging, totally drying up in some cases, and both the level and variability of CDS spreads went through the roof. Table 1 3 shows the behavior of Citibank's CDS spread index during the period just preceding
1 The recent literature on robustness is also based on the notion of multiple priors (Hansen and Sargent (2008) ) 2 Note that although such expansion of beliefs involves assignment of positive mass to bailout probabilities that had zero mass prior to Lehman's collapse the latter is not quite a "black swan" event (Taleb (2007) ). Taleb's black Swan is an event whose perceived probability had zero mass (or this event has not even been considered in the state space due to unawareness) prior to its initial realization. By contrast the perceived probability of no bailout prior to Lehman's collapse was not zero. However, after this event some bailout distributions that previously were assigned zero mass entered the set of bailout distributions with positive mass.
3 Source: Cochrane and Zingales (2009) .
Lehman's default and the final approval of the TARP bailout package at the beginning of October October. This supports the view that financial markets participants are quite sensitive to news about the likelihood of bailouts.
2008.

Date Event CDS Spread
Following Lehman's collapse and the ensuing public debate among policymakers about the wisdom of governmental bailouts two things happened. Public uncertainty (also known as ambiguity in the decision theory literature) about the likelihood of bailouts increased and so did the public's aversion to this uncertainty (or ambiguity aversion in the terminology of decision theory). Importantly, beliefs
are not the only determinant of an individual's subjective set of priors, but also her preferences concerning ambiguity. That is, this set need not be the set of priors that is literally deemed possible by the individual. In particular, suppose two individuals share the same subjective information, i.e., they both believe the same set of bailout probabilities are possible. Then modern decision theory implies that the set of multiple priors of the less ambiguity averse individual is a subset of the set of multiple priors of the more ambiguity averse individual (See, for example Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002, Theorem 17-(ii ) ) and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005, p. 1872) ).
Thus, expansion of the set of multiple bailout priors in the aftermath of Lehman's collapse may reflect more ambiguous beliefs or a higher degree of ambiguity aversion or both. Obviously both factors reinforce each other. Our sense is that, in the aftermath of the financial trauma caused by Lehman's default the increase in ambiguity aversion might have been more important and more persistent for reasons elaborated two paragraphs below. Be that as it may, the upshot is that following this episode the set of multiple priors about the probability of bailouts expanded. As a consequence the lower bound on the set of binomial distributions with perceived positive mass went down. The paper shows that lenders' expected utility is lower the lower is the probability of bailout.
In conjunction with the GS max-min criterion the expansion in the set of multiple priors implies that, once atraumatic event like Lehman's collapse materializes, lenders become more reluctant to lend either because the ambiguity of bailouts has increased, or because ambiguity aversion has increased, or both.
Since, by the max-min behavioral criterion individuals ultimately act in each period on the basis of only one bailout distribution their micro optimization problems collapse to maximization of expected utility given a unique probability of bailout in each period. Consequently, results identical to ours also obtain in the presence of only bailout risk provided the unique bailout probability is taken to be the worst probability distribution both prior to and following Lehman's collapse. This begs the question of why we choose to utilize the more cumbersome multiple priors framework rather than the simpler and more standard "risk only" framework.
The answer has two parts. First, following Keynes, we believe that the impacts on financial markets of major, largely unanticipated, events like the Lehman episode and its immediate aftermath are not adequately captured by the risk only framework. 4 Since there is no single objective probability that government will repay the debts of failing financial institutions it is natural for individuals to 4 Keynes (1937, pp. 114-115) believe that several bailout probability distributions are possible and to adjust the set of such priors in line with actual developments and news about government's intentions. The modern multiple priors framework provides an operational way to capture this uncertainty and to reduce its complexity to manageable proportions. Second, since, as reported above an increase in ambiguity aversion induces an enlargement of the set of priors, such an enlargement and the associated lower minimal probability of bailout also capture increases in ambiguity aversion following salient traumatic events.
Two recent real life episodes are consistent with this view. First, according to the Non-Life Insurance Rating Organization of Japan (NLIRO) stricken Fukushima prefecture, bearing the brunt of the huge earthquake and tsunami that devastated the region at the beginning of 2011, saw rates of new earthquake insurance coverage increase almost threefold in the aftermath of the earthquake (Majirox news, August 24 2011). Provided this event did not appreciably change the beliefs of individuals about the objective probability distribution of such events this evidence is consistent with the view that, following the trauma caused by the tsunami, the set of multiple priors concerning such events expanded mainly because of an increase in ambiguity aversion rather than in ambiguity.
Second, the risk only approach appears to be inconsistent with the evolution of events over the entire four years since Lehman's collapse. Although it is reasonable to expect that during the first several months following this event the (assumed single) bailout probability was adjusted downward it is harder to maintain such a position later on. The reason is that since Lehman's collapse US policymakers introduced various measures, such as TARP and numerous quantitative easing programs, that most likely, have led the public to believe that the probability of bailout moved back up. In spite of this, the share of total US banks reserves in total banking credit that increased by a factor of about 20 upon Lehman's collapse (from half a percent to 12 percent), remained in the range of this elevated level at least till the beginning of 2012 (Cukierman (2013) ). This behavior is inconsistent with a story of a single bailout prior that first went down and subsequently back up.
By contrast it is consistent with a persistent change in ambiguity aversion within a multiple priors framework.
We turn next to a brief overview of the main structure of the paper. The financial system is composed of large numbers of each of the following: Ultimate borrowers (investors), fully diversified ultimate lenders (like pension and mutual funds) and financial intermediaries that borrow from the lenders and lend to investors. Leverage levels assumed by borrowers and extended to them by financial intermediaries depend on the cost of credit and on (rational) expectations about the future cost of credit. Since returns to investors are stochastic some of them default and do not repay their debts to financial intermediaries. As a consequence some of the intermediaries are unable to repay their debts to lenders. Government bailout policy consist in (stochastically) repaying the debt of failing intermediaries to lenders. Beliefs about the likelihood of such bailouts affect the amount of credit offered exante to financial intermediaries by lenders, and through them on the amount of credit offered by the latter to borrowers and on the general equilibrium level of interest rates. Thus, in spite of the fact that potential bailouts only target loans from lenders to financial intermediaries, government's stochastic bailout policy affects leverage and interest rate throughout the entire financial system.
The main objectives of the paper are: (i) To identify the mechanisms through which beliefs about bailout policy affect short term credit within the financial system, interest rates and credit to the real sector. (ii) To trace out the impact of an expost (after long term investment decisions have been made) change in bailout perceptions on interest rates and the volume of defaults throughout the entire financial system. (iii) To analyze the impact of expansionary monetary policy on leverage and risk appetite. The paper's framework makes it possible to trace out both the exante and the expost consequences of beliefs about the generosity of bailout policies. Exante, a more generous bailout policy increases moral hazard in all segments of the financial system and induces an overall expansion of credit.
5 But expost the maintenance of a generous bailout policy may become necessary just to avoid a crisis even if government no longer desires to maintain high bailout levels.
Important features of the model include: (i) An individual tradeoff between return seeking through higher levels of leverage and higher probability of total loss at the individual level.
(ii)
Exante and expost relations between the worst probability of bailout and leverage at the aggregate 5 Borio C. and M. Drehmann (2009) convincingly argue that such a credit buildup raises the likelihood of a financial crisis.
level. (iii) Duration mismatches:
Borrowers need financing for two periods but get only one period loans from financial intermediaries in each period. (iv) The model's focus is on the segment of the shadow banking system (like SIV and hedge funds) in which funds are secured only for short periods. Accordingly, financial intermediaries are assumed to borrow for only one period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general overview of the model. Sections 3, 4 and 5 introduce a typical borrower, a typical financial intermediary and a typical lender and characterize the optimal microeconomic behavior of each type of agent. Government's bailout policy is specified in Section 5. General equilibrium of the financial system and the determination of market rates are discussed in section 6. Section 7 analyzes the impact of an exogenous decrease in perceptions about the likelihood of bailout on financial markets. Section 8 discusses the exante choice of leverage by borrowers in general equilibrium including, in particular, the impact of perceived bailout policy and the associated moral hazard problem. Section 9 reflects on the social desirability of exante commitments to a particular bailout policy. This is followed by concluding remarks in Section 10. A central result of the paper (implied by the discussion in sections 7 and 8 and elaborated in the conclusion) is that higher bailout uncertainty raises the amplitude of booms and busts. Most proofs are in the Appendix.
Framework
There is a large number of each of the following risk averse (identical within each group) 3 types of agents: Borrowers (B), Financial intermediaries (F) and Lenders (L) each possessing one unit of equity capital.
6 The initial masses of each type of agent are M B , M L and M F for borrowers, financial intermediaries and lenders, respectively.
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There are 3 time periods labeled 0, 1 and 2. Only borrowers-investors have access to real investment decisions. All such decisions are made by them in period 0 and are long term in the sense, that 6 We use the following notational conventions: the subscript j = {B, F, L} to a variable x jt indicates the agent type, and subscript t = {0, 1, 2} indicates time. When the time index is omitted the variable refers to any of the time periods between 0 and 2. Random variables are identified by a tilde on top of the variable (e.g. X).
7 The financial markets model in the paper can be thought of as a microfounded version of general equilibrium approaches to monetary theory and policy (Brunner and Meltzer (1997) , Tobin (1969) ).
once chosen, the project's size cannot be adjusted. The selected project size is (1 + L B ), where 1 is the borrower's initial equity capital and L B is the leverage he selects to take. Only short term loans are available to borrowers with interest rates r B1 and r B2 for loans assumed in the first and in the second period, respectively. Interest rates on loans and project's yields are all specified in terms of net returns.
Each borrower can get loans only from financial intermediaries. The amount of leverage, L B , demanded by a borrower is determined as a function of r B1 and of expected r B2 , by means of individual optimization. Each financial intermediary can obtain short-term funds, L F , from lenders.
The intermediaries generally splits his total funds (1 + L F ) between a fraction z F allocated to a partially diversified portfolio of loans to borrowers and a fraction (1 − z F ) allocated to a risk free asset that pays a fixed interest rate r f .
8 The return on the risk free asset, r f , is determined by the monetary authority.
Financial intermediaries pay to lenders short term interest rates r L1 and r L2 in periods 1 and 2 (for loans taken in periods 0 and 1) respectively. A typical lender splits his initial wealth of 1 between a fraction z L of funds allocated to loans to financial intermediaries and a remaining fraction,
, that is invested in the risk free asset. In contrast to a typical financial intermediary, whose portfolio of loans to borrowers is only partially diversified, a typical lender holds his selected portion of loans to financial intermediaries in a fully diversified portfolio of loans.
The supply of loans to borrowers by an individual financial intermediary and his demand for loans from lenders, L F , are determined through the intermediary's individual optimization as a function of the interest rates r B1 , r B2 , r L1 and r L2 . Those interest rates are determined through general equilibrium competitive clearing in periods 0 and 1 respectively in two markets within each period:
The market for loans from intermediaries to borrowers and the market for loans from lenders to financial intermediaries.
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As elaborated in the next section, returns on real projects are stochastic and therefore risky.
They realize in period 2. A real-project yield, Y P , depends on two independent random variables:
an aggregate economy-wide shock, Y A , and a specific (idiosyncratic) shock, Y I . The realization of the aggregate shock is not revealed prior to period 2. Although all idiosyncratic shocks realize only in period 2, the value of this future realization becomes publicly known for some borrowers already in period 1. Depending on the information available in period 1 borrowers can be classified to one of the following three groups: Lucky borrowers for whom it becomes known they will get a high Y I , unlucky borrowers for whom it becomes known they will get a low Y I , and regular borrowers for whom no advance return information is available in period 1. The availability of such information is important because it affects the borrower's ability to get refinancing in period 1. Since project yield is random and borrowers have some leverage obligations they generally may default in either of periods 1 or 2. A borrower defaults in period 1 if he does not succeed in securing credit to carry over his project on to period 2. He defaults in period 2 if the total final project return does no suffice to service the debt incurred in the previous period.
A financial intermediary can also default in period 1 or 2 if the principal and the interest rate paid to him by borrowers cannot cover his obligations to lenders. When a financial intermediary defaults lenders lose their entire investment in this intermediary including the principal and the interest rate. Government can possibly and selectively pay the debt of defaulting financial intermediaries to lenders. But governmental bailout policy is uncertain in the Knigthian sense. More precisely, individuals entertain multiple priors about the probability of bailout, or in the language of modern decision theory -government's bailout policy is ambiguous. 
Real investment projects
All real investment made in period 0 are long term in the sense, that once chosen, the project's size cannot be adjusted, until returns are realized in period 2. The typical investment project yields a stochastic (net) return, Y P , which may be either positive or negative.
10 All real projects have the same distribution of returns, and the yields of any two different projects are correlated due to presence of the aggregate common component in Y P .
A project's net yield is the sum of an aggregate shock Y A and of an individual idiosyncratic shock
We assume, for tractability, that both the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shocks, are binomially and 10 Returns, whether positive or negative, are cash flows.
identically distributed. That is
where the parameter y satisfies 0 ≤ y ≤ 1/2. The random variables Y A and Y I are statistically independent and the idiosyncratic shock, Y I , is independent across projects. 11 Equations (1)- (2) imply that the distribution of Y P is
Notice that the risk of a project is a function of y: Given two projects with identical q a higher y implies a riskier project. By equations (1)- (2) the expected return of each of the component shocks
Since the project net return is the sum of Y A and Y I , which are equal in distribution, its expected return is
Projects must have a positive expected return to be considered; i.e. Y P > 0, which implies that q > 1 2 . project size is 1 and the lowest return on a project is −2y we impose the constraint
This consraint enforces limited liability by ruling out negative realizations of wealth when there is no
leverage . 
Borrower
F R B1 = (1 + r B1 ) L B Debt service .
When he gets credit in period 1, B's ultimate debt service in period 2 is
The borrower's cost of capital for the entire project's life (from period 0 till period 2) is therefore
We assume that when the borrower cannot obtain refinancing in period 1 or cannot repay the debt in period 2, he defaults, the project is lost and neither the borrower nor the financial intermediary receives any payoff. Thus, due to limited liability, the amount needed to cover losses (if any) is 0.
The next section explores the borrower's solvency condition.
Borrower
′ s solvency conditions
Period 0
A borrower is able to get a loan in period 0 only if the total expected payoff from his project is higher than the total debt service liability expected for period 2, that is
where r
) − 1 is the expected (as of period 0) cumulated interest rate factor over the lifetime of the project. Assumption 1 implies that this condition is satisfied for all non-negative leverage levels.
Period 1
Although all borrowers are identical exante (in period 0), they split into three groups in period 1.
Those groups differ in terms of the information that becomes available to markets in that period about the realizations of their idiosyncratic shocks in period 2. In particular, it becomes known in period 1 that a fraction, θ LB < q, of borrowers will have Y I = y, a fraction θ U B < 1 − q will get Y I = −y, and no new information is revealed in period 1 about the remaining borrowers. We refer to those three types of borrowers as Lucky borrowers (LB), Unlucky borrowers (UB) and Regular Borrowers (RB) respectively.
A borrower who decides to leverage his project in period 0 is solvent in period 1 if and only if he is able to obtain the refinancing required to maintain his project alive till period 2. Financial intermediaries will offer the required credit in period 1 if and only if the expected cash flow of the project in period 2 suffices to cover period's 1 debt service. Obviously this expected cash flow differs across borrowers' types implying that borrower of type j = {LB, U B, RB} obtains refinancing in period 1 if and only if
where I 1 is the information set of period 1. Given period's 1 information
and
is the probability that a regular borrower will get a good draw on the idiosyncratic shock, Y I , given the information available in period 1.
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Assumption 2: The expected net return of a RB on a real project conditional on the information
Assumption 2 decreases, implying that, the higher the cost of capital, the wider is the range of leverages at which a borrower might default in period 1. Increasing risk (measured in terms of returns' variance) has a similar effect since it decreases L 1 B .
14 On the other hand, when the probability of good returns 12 The reason this probability differs between periods 0 and 1 is that the realizations of Y I become known with certainty for a fraction, θ, of borrowers in period 1.
13 Overly strong jointly sufficient conditions for this requirement are θ LB = θ U B and q > 1 − q.. 14 It is easily checked that increasing y, while keeping the probabilities of good and bad outcomes (q and (1 − q)) increases (i.e q increases), the critical leverage, L 1 B , increases widening the range of leverages for which the probability of default in period 1 is zero.
Period 2
A borrower is solvent in period 2 if the payoff from his project suffices to cover his debt obligation, that is
Straightforward algebra shows that this is equivalent to the requirement that ultimate wealth, W B (.), is non negative
When the final project's payoff does no suffice to cover the principal and interest rate payments the borrower defaults and loses the entire project including his initial equity. Due to limited liability the net return on the project in this case is Y P = −1 and the financial intermediary who own the debt receives nothing.
Lemma 1 has shown that when period's 0 leverage is higher than some critical value the borrower is exposed to default risk in period 1. In addition positive leverage also exposes borrowers to default risk in period 2. The following Lemma identifies regular borrower's solvency conditions in period 2 for various realizations of total returns. Next, we analyze the probabilities of default in periods 1 and 2 as functions of the leverage chosen in period 0. Since payoffs are discrete those relations take the form of step functions. The precise probabilities of defaults are:
Lemma 2: If a regular borrower's ultimate return is: (i) Y P = −2y he is solvent in period 2 if and only if
, where Pr (D 1 ) and Pr (D 2 ) stand for default probabilities in period 1 and 2 respectively.
Borrower's optimization
Not surprisingly the individual borrower faces a tradeoff between expected payoff and default probability. In the large, by raising leverage, he raises the expected value of terminal equity but also the chances of default. By Proposition 1 the exante probability of default is a step function of leverage. This implies that the optimal level of leverage (and by implication also the optimal project's size) must coincide with one of the four leverage levels at the jump points of the probability of default function. The reason is that, once leverage is extended beyond a given jump point the probability of default remains constant as long as leverage is not pushed beyond the next jump point.
Within such an interval, raising leverage raises the expected payoff without raising the probability of default.
Hence, once leverage is raised beyond a given jump point, it is individually optimal to push it (at least) all the way till just a tiny bit before the probability function's next jump point. It follows that, from the vantage point of period 0, the optimal level of leverage is either zero or one of the following three leverage levels:
;
The borrower's utility function is piecewise linear with a penalty in the event of default. In particular utility is linear in wealth as long as the borrower is solvent. When insolvent the borrower is subject to a penalty that increases with the magnitude of leverage he defaults on. Formally
where W B is his period's 2 terminal wealth after servicing all debts and P B is a fixed default penalty per unpaid leverage dollar in states of insolvency. Hence, the borrower's expected utility is
Using Proposition 1 and the definition of W B (·) in equations (8) and (9) establishes that B ′ s expected utilities at each of the five candidates for optimal leverage (four discussed above plus any
where
Let L * B be the optimal level of leverage. The following proposition presents (overly restrictive)
Proposition 2: Provided The broad intuition underlying this proposition can be appreciated by starting with the particular case in which the unit penalty, P B , for default is zero. In this case, when the chances of good draws at the individual level are high (q and θ LB are large) and the likelihood that the borrower will be unlucky in period 1 is low (θ U B is small), expected utility is monotonically increasing in leverage.
As a matter of fact, given the full linearity of the utility function in the absence of a penalty, the borrower's optimal level of leverage is infinite in this case. However, in the presence of a sufficiently large default penalty extending leverage beyond L H B is not individually optimal because of the increase in the risk that the penalty will be triggered once leverage crosses the L H B threshold.
In a broad sense the conditions in the Proposition 2 are analogous to the borrower's second order condition (SOC) when the penalties from default rise continuously with leverage. In the continuous case the SOC assures that, as leverage goes up, the favorable marginal impact of higher leverage on return in good states diminishes in comparison to the unfavorable gradual increase in the default penalty. Similarly, the conditions in Proposition 2 assure that, as leverage rises, the marginal detrimental impact of the default penalty becomes more important relatively to the marginal favorable effect on likely profits.
Financial intermediaries (Fs)
For reasons that will become apparent later it is convenient to open this section with a forward look at the relation between various equilibrium rates of interest.
A forward look at general equilibrium
The following proposition establishes general equilibrium relations between equilibrium interest rates, 
The typical financial intermediary
There is a large number of financial intermediaries (Fs) each of which possesses one unit of core funds consisting of a combination of equity and of long term (two periods) debt. A typical F can also raise short term (one period) funds from lenders.
15 Since the focus of this analysis is on changes in the availability of short term credit in the face of new information, the amount of short term leverage assumed by a typical F is determined endogenously while the sum of equity and of long term debt is taken to be exogenous.
Total financial resources of a typical F consist of the core funds and of short term leverage, L F .
The financial intermediary diversifies his total resources between the risk free asset whose rate, r f , is a policy instrument, and a risky, not fully diversified, portfolio of loans to borrowers. 16 For reasons of tractability, each F lends to only two borrowers. The fraction of resources invested in the risky loan portfolio to Bs is denoted z F . Let W F be the intermediary's terminal wealth after debt service in each period. F is solvent or insolvent in each period depending on whether terminal wealth is non negative or strictly negative. When solvent, F's utility is described by a CRRA utility function with a coefficient, δ > 0, of risk aversion that is close to, but not quite equal to, 0. This specification implies that F is almost, but not strictly, risk neutral. When insolvent, the typical intermediary 15 For instance through various deposits including certificates of deposit (CDs). 16 By contrast, as shown in the next section, the risky portfolio of suppliers of funds to Fs (lenders) is fully diversified.
experiences a (per unit of leverage) penalty, P F . Formally
Distribution of returns, solvency and optimization
Total return to a financial intermediary depends on the performance of the two borrowers to whom he lends. Since borrowers are identical exante, the optimal risky portfolio of an F consists of a fiftyfifty split between loans to his two debtors. If both borrowers are solvent both of them pay the full face value, of the gross debt service and the payoff (from one unit) to F is 1 + r B . If both of them default F gets a payoff of 0 on his risky portfolio. If one borrower is solvent and the other defaults (1 + r B ). Obviously, the probabilities associated with each of those three payoffs depend on the probabilities of defaults of borrowers and differ between periods 0 and 1. From the vantage point of period zero, the probability a single B defaults in period 1 , Pr (D 1 ), is given in
, the probability that a B is insolvent in period 1 is θ U B . Since the probability of being unlucky of any borrower is statistically independent of this probability for any other borrower, the distribution of payoffs faced by a typical intermediary in period 0 is given by the following table.
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Period 1 Period 2
State Payoff ( R B ) Probability Probability
Exactly one B is solvent
Both Bs are insolvent 0 θ
Recall that q is the probability of a positive (aggregate or idiosyncratic) shock and q 1 , defined in Equation (6), is the probability of a positive idiosyncratic shock conditional on the project type that is revealed in period 1. The last column shows the probability distribution of period's 2 payoffs from 17 In spite of the fact that utility functions differ across the three types of agents we use the symbol u(·) to stand for all of them in order to economize on notation. In each case the identity of the player should be evident from the context. 18 The notation γ bt stands for probability in time t conditional on realized borrowers' types, b.
loans to regular borrowers as perceived by F's in period 1.
The wealth of a typical F at the end of each period is
where the distributions of R B is given in Equation (14) and r L is the interest rate paid by a F on its short term obligations. A representative F chooses his leverage, L F , and the fraction, z F , of resources invested in the risky loan portfolio so as to maximize Eu( W F ) in each of periods 0 and 1.
The following proposition presents a preliminary characterization of F's optimal policy. 
F's solvency condition
Proposition 4 and Equation (15) imply that F is solvent if and only if
Since r B > r L , F is solvent for any level of leverage, L F , when both of his borrowers are solvent, so
In the other two cases F is solvent only if L F is sufficiently small. The precise solvency conditions are:
Equations (14) and (17) imply that F's probability of default is an increasing step function of F's leverage and that the precise functions for periods 1 and 2 are
Proposition 5: Provided:
Here L * F t , t = {0, 1} is the financial intermediary's optimal short term leverage in periods 0 and 1.
The following proposition formulates the financial intermediary's solvency condition. If solvent a financial intermediary pays the full debt service to lenders. Otherwise he defaults and pays nothing. 
The representative lender and bailout policy
Through pension or mutual funds the representative lender (L) splits his equity between a fully diversified portfolio of loans to financial intermediaries and the risk free asset. 19 Since, exante, all
Fs have identical distributions of returns the optimal shares of loans to different Fs are all equal.
The fraction invested in the risky loan portfolio to Fs is denoted z L . The typical lender possesses 19 The lender is representative in the sense that all lenders are identical.
where W L is his terminal wealth in each period and α characterizes the degree of constant absolute risk aversion.
Perceived government's bailout policy
Government may repay the gross debt owed to lenders by defaulting Fs. The perceived probability that the debt service of a defaulting F is paid by government (a bailout) is denoted by p. The degree of uncertainty and of aversion to it is determined by the "size" of the set of possible priors. That is, when circumstances become more uncertain (ambiguous), or when ambiguity aversion increases, the set of possible priors expands to include priors that previously were considered implausible. Consequently, provided some of the set enlargement is toward lower p's, the worst prior, π, is revised downward.
Representative lender's returns and optimization
Period 0
On one period loans taken in period 0 borrowers face only idiosyncratic risk because only individually unlucky borrowers default in period 1, implying that financial intermediaries who lend to them also face only idiosyncratic risk in that period. By contrast, since they fully diversify their loans across 20 See Sargent (1987) pages 154-155. 21 Knightian uncertainty and aversion to it are also known as "ambiguity" and "ambiguity aversion" in modern decision theory.
intermediaries, lenders face no risk at all in period 0. Consequently, and since lenders know from Equation (14) that only a fraction, (1 − θ U B ) 2 , of Fs will be solvent in period 1, equilibrium r L1 includes a compensation for the average fraction of unpaid debt but no compensation for variability of this fraction, since this variability equals zero due to full diversification. Hence,
2 ] is the probability that a lender loses the investment in a loan to a single intermediary. It is obtained as the product of the probabilities of the two following independent events: "the intermediary defaults" and "government does not reimburse the delinquent debt to the lender". As a consequence, in period 0, lenders are indifferent between investing in the standard risk free asset at rate r f 1 and between investing in loans to Fs.
Period 1
By contrast, in period 1, lenders face risk in loans to Fs in spite of their fully diversified portfolios.
The reason is that the returns to lenders from loans to different Fs are correlated due to the common shock, R A , in the return to real investments of borrowers. As explained in the previous section a financial intermediary either pays his debt in full to lenders or fully defaults. When F defaults on the debt service, government may or may not step in and pay the delinquent debt service to a lender.
Consequently the lender faces a binomial distribution of returns from lending to an individual F -he either gets the full debt service, 1+r L , (from F or from government) or 0. Although the bailout policy of government does not affect the binomial nature of the payoffs from a single F, it does alter their distribution. Since the risky portfolio of L's contains a large number of such binomially distributed loans the risky portfolio of Ls is normally distributed with a mean and a variance that depend on both economic (q) and political (p) uncertainties. Details appear in the following proposition.
Proposition 8: For a given p period's 2 payoff to a lender on his fully diversified portfolio of loans, { R L2 }, is normally distributed with mean
and variance
and { R L2 } stands for the set of possible returns from loans to F's.
A representative L chooses the fraction, z L , of resources invested in the risky loan portfolio to Fs so as to maximize
in each period, where
Proposition 9: At an individual optimum, a lender allocates the fraction
of each single $ to the diversified risky portfolio of loans to Fs.
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Partial equilibrium comparative statics
We now investigate the impact of less generous bailouts on the size of lenders' risky portfolios and the impact of ambiguity aversion in partial equilibrium. In the absence of bailout uncertainty government's bailout policy is characterized by a unique perceived probability, p, that government will pay the debt of delinquent F's to L's. A more generous (towards L's) bailout policy is characterized by a higher p and a less generous bailout policy by a lower p. By changing the distribution of r L the value of p affects both the mean and the variance of lenders' risky portfolios.
Proposition 10: Holding r L2 constant a perceived less generous bailout policy (lower p)
22 The variance is scaled by the term (1 + r L2 ) 2 for reasons of space. 23 The right hand side of Equation (25) is obtained by using a typical lender's utility function in equation (20) . 24 This approximation is accurate for a small risk premium,
, is obtained for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences (see Merton 1971 Merton , 1973 .
(i) reduces the mean return on the portfolio of loans from lenders to financial intermediaries, (ii) raises the covariance between any two loans in the (fully diversified) portfolio, and therefore, the portfolio's variance, (iii) Both changes reinforce each other in inducing a "flight to safety" by lenders.
In the presence of uncertainty about p, and since they are averse to ambiguity in the GilboaSchmeidler (1989) sense, lenders behave as if the probability of bailout is the lowest within the set of p's with positive mass (denoted π).
26,27 Stated differently, they choose the fraction of their portfolio invested in risky loans to Fs so as to maximize expected utility under the assumption that bailout probability is π. The operational consequence of such behavior is that p should be replaced with π in propositions 8 and 10. We remind the reader that this behavioral mode reflects both uncertainty about the correct bailout distribution as well as aversion to this uncertainty.
Propositions 10 implies that higher bailout uncertainty and/or aversion has two effects: Not surprisingly it lowers the expected return from the risky loan portfolio of lenders. More surprisingly, but not less importantly, it raises the correlation between loans in the portfolio which implies in turn higher variances in lenders portfolios. This result appears surprising at first blush since intuition may lead one to conclude that an increase in bailout probability, by decreasing the likelihood of default, will increase the correlation between loans' returns in the portfolio. But this intuition is mistaken. The reason is that the correlation originates uniquely from the aggregate shock whose impact operates only through the fraction of loans in the portfolio that are no bailed out. Since the impact of this fraction on the overall correlation diminishes as more intermediaries are bailed out the variance goes down. Consequently, in the limit, when bailouts are almost certain, this variance tends to zero.
The aggregate covariance between all pairs of loans in the fully diversified portfolio is one measure of systemic risk in financial markets. Hence, Part (ii) of Proposition 10 implies that an increase in bailout uncertainty raises systemic risk. Furthermore, recalling (from the introduction) that expansion of the set of multiple priors toward lower bailout probabilities is likely to reflect a persistent increase in ambiguity aversion following traumatic events, Part (ii) of Proposition 10 implies that systemic risks depend also on preferences.
Proposition 10 implies that, when due to an increase in bailout uncertainty and/or aversion to it π decreases, lenders reduce the share of funds supplied to financial intermediaries. This conclusion plays an important role in the following general equilibrium sections.
It is easy to check that the sufficient condition in the proposition is satisfied for practically all normal levels of interest rates.
General equilibrium of the financial system
Given expectations about the future, general equilibrium of the financial system is characterized by two market clearing conditions. One for credit from Ls to Fs and the other for credit from Fs to Bs. 
General equilibrium in period 0
Proposition 1 implies that a borrower is insolvent in period 1 only if he is unlucky, implying (from the discussion in Section 4) that a financial intermediary defaults in period 1 if and only if at least one of his borrowers is unlucky. Being unlucky is related to B's and Fs individual fortunes rather than to the aggregate shock. Lenders are exposed to aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic shocks;
aggregate shocks are relevant only in period 2 while idiosyncratic shocks are fully diversified. Hence, since lenders are fully diversified and lend to Fs for only one period, they do not face any risk in lending to them in period 0. In particular they know for sure (from Equation (14)) that a fraction
2 ) of intermediaries will default in period 1. Hence, they demand a compensation only for this known with certainty fraction of defaults. Consequently, in period 0, r L1 is determined exogenously by the condition
Actual period's 0 equilibrium conditions in the markets for loans from Ls to Fs and from Fs to Bs are given respectively by
They determine z L1 and r B1 as functions of r L1 and r 
The two period's 0 market clearing conditions and the two clearing conditions expected for period 1 jointly determine r B1 , r 
General equilibrium in period 1
The actual period's 1 market clearing conditions in the markets for loans from Ls to Fs and from Fs to Bs are given respectively by (33) we note that the first two arguments of those functions differ.
Not surprisingly the first, which refers to the expected equilibrium, features r e L2 , while the second, that refers to the actual equilibrium, features r L2 . Importantly, the effective bailout probabilities, π 0 and π 1 , differ across the expected and the actual period's 1 equilibria. This (at this stage) notational difference is introduced in anticipation of the discussion in the next section that introduces an unanticipated increase in bailout uncertainty.
The impact of bailout uncertainty
This section considers the impact of an unanticipated increase in bailout uncertainty on financial markets in period 1. Recall first that π 0 is the lowest bailout probability in the multiple priors set as perceived in period 0 for both periods 0 and 1. 28 The fact that, as of period 0, financial market participants do not expect this probability to change in period 1 is reflected in the formulation of the expected period's 1 general equilibrium conditions for period 0 (equations (29) through (32)).
Suppose now that, following a major indication of a shift in government's bailout policy-like not rescuing Lehman-bailout uncertainty and/or aversion to it increase. In particular, the lowest perceived bailout probability with positive mass decrease from π 0 to π 1 . 
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The comparative statics impacts in Proposition 12 accord well with the flight to quality and the general increase in the cost of debt observed following the downfall of Lehman Brothers. They are consistent with the view that much of the financial market panic, and the associated arrest of financial markets, in the aftermath of this collapse was due to increases in uncertainty and uncertainty aversion about the willingness of the US government to use public funds to compensate creditors' for losses due to defaulting financial intermediaries.
Following the outbreak of the crisis one of the expost explanations offered for the fact that so many market participants failed to see it coming was that they underestimated the systemic risks due to the correlation between the returns on different assets. The framework of this paper suggests that underestimation of this correlation prior to the crisis may be due to the fact that, by proposition 10 
Bailout uncertainty, the banking spread and the credit spread
The banking (or intermediation) spread.is defined as the difference between the rate, r B , that financial intermediaries charge to borrowers and the rate, r L , that they pay to lenders. By changing the general equilibrium level of interest rates a change in bailout uncertainty also changes the banking spread. The following proposition links the spread to bailout uncertainty.
Proposition 13:
(i) Generally, depending on whether
is smaller or larger than | The credit spread is generally defined as the difference between the yield on private debt instruments and government securities Within the analytical frameork of this paper the credit spread corresponds to the difference between the rate, r L2 , charged by lenders to financial intermediaries and the risk free rate, r f . The following corollary summarizes the impact of a, period's 1, increase in bailout uncertainty on the credit spread.
Corollary to proposition 12: An increase in uncertainty about governmental bailout policy leads
to an increase in the credit spread.
Interestingly, recent empirical proxies of credit spreads due to Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011) this raises, given r B1 , the demand for leverage by Bs. This higher demand for leverage raises r B1 and this reduces the demand for leverage by Bs. However, as suggested by proposition 14 the first effect always dominates implying that, ultimately, lower exante bailout uncertainty perceived for period 1 induces a credit expansion already in period 0.
Clearly, the belief that government may repay the debt of some delinquent financial intermediaries creates a moral hazard problem. An important implication of Proposition 14 is that, by raising leverage in the economy, the perception of a more generous bailout policy, aggravates this problem and increases the likelihood and the severity of a potential financial crisis in period 1. Note that this moral hazard problem is more important either when individuals are more confident about their probability assessments (lower ambiguity) or when they are less averse to uncertainty (lower ambiguity aversion). When the period's 0 decrease in r f is permanent in the sense that it is expected to last also through period 1 there is a further expansionary effect on the equilibrium volume of credit in period 0. This effect operates through the same channels that an increase in π 0 does. That is, by reducing expected future rates, a lower expected future policy rate induces further increases in the current volume of credit.
The impact of a temporary expansionary monetary policy
Broad interpretation of propositions 14 and 15:
The subprime crisis counterpart of period 0 in the model can be thought of as the buildup phase of the crisis. During this phase market participants believed that the set of bailout probabilities with positive mass is concentrated in a range with relatively high values of p and were relatively insensitive to the consequent uncertainty. In addition, monetary policy was loose by historical standards. Propositions 14 and 15 imply that both factors contributed to the exante expansion of credit and to a real investment boom, making the system more fragile to a sudden downward revision of perceptions about the likelihood of governmental bailouts.
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Should government commit to a bailout policy?
This section briefly reflects on the desirability (or undesirability) of bailout uncertainty. The discussion in the previous section suggests that higher exante bailout uncertainty and/or aversion to it reduces the volume of leverage and with it the level of real investment activity undertaken by borrowers. The discussion in section 7 suggests that higher expost (after long term investment decisions have been made) bailout uncertainty and/or aversion to it lead to higher levels of defaults and, in parallel, to the destruction of existing investments by borrowers. The first result opens the door for the conclusion that some exante bailout uncertainty and/or aversion to it may be desirable since it keeps the buildup of credit in check thereby alleviating potential future burdens on taxpayers as well 30 It is noteworthy that within four to six months after the panic that followed Lehman's collapse CDS spreads returned to subsantially lower levels. In terms of the model this is consistent with the view that, after the TARP legislation was finally passed in early October 2008 and actually implemented in the following months along with a dramatic expansion of monetary policy, bailout uncertainty along with aversion to it receded in the sense that the worst bailout probability with positive mass increased relatively to its level during the second half of September 2008. The broader implication of this observation is that government actions can reduce as well as increase both bailout uncertainty and the public's attitudes to this uncertainty.
as potential defaults. But, in the spirit of the "lender of last resort" view, the second result provides an argument for reducing bailout uncertainty and the (possibly associated aversion to it) expost in order to avoid bankrupcies and the associated destruction of capital and economic activity It would therefore appear at first blush that, although higher bailout uncertainty is disruptive expost, it may be desirable exante.
This begs the question of whether the optimal level of bailout uncertainty (or ambiguity) may be internal. Although answering this important question is largely beyond the scope of this paper it is briefly touched upon at the end of this section. But the analysis in the two previous sections does implies that, whatever the optimal level of bailout uncertainty, over time changes in both directions in this level are inefficient. This statement is based on the view that welfare in the economy is higher the lower is the volume of investments destroyed or missed due to errors in evaluating bailout uncertainty. As shown in the previous two sections an increase in bailout uncertainty and/or aversion to it between periods 0 and 1 leads to period's 0 investment and leverage levels in excess of what those levels would have been in the absence of the change, and consequently to defaults and capital destruction in period 1 in excess of their levels in the absence of the change. Hence, given the initial levels of bailout uncertainty and of aversion to it, welfare is higher in the absence of the change.
When bailout uncertainty goes down period's 0 investments by borrowers are lower than what they would have been, had they known in advance that period's 1 bailout uncertainty will be lower and the level of investments in the economy is suboptimally low.
We now come back to the question regarding the desirability of bailout uncertainty. One way to reduce this uncertainty is to have government commit to a particular probability of bailout, p c . Such a policy, if successful, eliminates multiple priors beliefs from the minds of individuals and, in parallel, reduces the impact of uncertainty aversion. Provided p c is not higher than the minimal multiple priors entertained by individuals prior to the commitment this has the beneficial effect of minimizing excessive leverage buildups.
Concluding remarks
A major result of our analysis is that the larger the change in bailout uncertainty, and the potentially associated change in aversion to this uncertainty, the stronger the pre-crisis buildup and the deeper the ensuing crisis. The detailed mechanics of this result can be appreciated by thinking of period 0 as the pre-crisis phase during which the lowest perceived likelihood of bailout is high and monetary policy relatively loose leading to credit expansion and to an investment boom. Taylor By Proposition 14 the pre-crisis bubbly credit boom is larger the larger π 0 . By Proposition 12 the magnitudes of deleveraging and of insolvencies (real and financial) is larger the lower is π 1 . Since it measures the extent to which the subjective set of possible bailout distributions widened between periods 0 and 1 the difference π 0 − π 1 is a natural proxy for the increase in bailout uncertainty cum aversion. Combining this proxy with Propositions 14 and 12 yields the conclusion that higher changes in bailout uncertainty cum uncertainty aversion are associated with larger pre-crisis bubbles as well as with higher levels of insolvencies and destruction of real economic activity when the bubble bursts. The crucial variable through which those effects operate is leverage. It expands more during periods of optimism about the likelihood of bailouts but, by the same token, it shrinks more violently during periods of pessimism about the likelihood of bailouts.
31 Given π 1 the deleveraging process during period 1 involves a larger volume of insolvencies the larger is π 0 . The reason is that a larger π 0 raises the exante leverage buildup in comparison to what market operators would have engaged 31 In terms of the multiple priors model periods of optimism can be thought as being characterized by low ambiguity aversion and period of pessimism by high levels of ambiguity aversion.
in, had they known already in period 0 that the probability of bailout in period 1 will drop to π 1 . The larger this "excessive" credit buildup, the larger the expost volume of insolvencies in the real economy.
The paper shows that the perceptions of market participants about systemic risks as captured by the aggregate covariance between the returns on different loans within the fully diversified portfolio of lenders is systematically related to bailout uncertainty and ambiguity aversion. In particular, even within a fully rational world, a higher level of bailout uncertainty and/or uncertainty aversion is associated with a higher level of perceived systemic risks (propositions 10 and 12). A novel broader implication of this analysis is that, in the presence of bailout uncertainty, the level of systemic risk may increase just because of an increase in ambiguity aversion following a traumatic event such as Lehman's collapse implying that systemic risk levels depend on preferences. Furthermore, the effect of increasing systemic risk due to changes in preferences for ambiguity is likely to be persistent.
Somewhat analogously to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) (DD in the sequel) classic model of bank runs, a main objective of this paper was to identify circumstances that trigger a financial crisis. A main result of the DD framework is that deposit insurance eliminates runs on the banks. Although there is an analogy between the role of deposit insurance in DD and bailouts in our framework, a crucial difference between them is that, up to a given limit, deposit insurance is backed by the exante certainty of a legal act while the availability (and scope) of the generalized bailouts considered here is shrouded in uncertainty and is likely to remain in this state also in the future. Besides other obvious differences two additional difference worth emphasizing are: (i) In DD liquidity shocks are exogenous while here they are related to an increase in uncertainty due to the arrival of new information about "black swan" events. (ii) Our framework features a more detailed picture of the financial sector and is designed to make statements about the impact of monetary policy on leverage and the economy. Like Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008) this paper attributes flight to quality episodes to the existence of Knightian uncertainty. But we argue that flight to quality episodes are likely to additionally reflect increases in aversion to uncertainty following traumatic, largely unanticipated events like the downfall of Lehman's Brothers. One implication of this view is that, such events tend to raise both uncertainty and the aversion to it. Although, in practice, individuals may find it hard to disentangle uncertainty from uncertainty aversion, the Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989) max-min with multiple priors framework utilized in the paper does not require them to seperate between those factors in order to optimally react to such changes. More broadly decreases in uncertainty and in uncertainty aversion provide a structured way to understand some of the factors that lie behind Keynes "animal spirits" and to link them to abrupt changes in government policy and other exogenous events. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) present broad evidence supporting the view that private financial crises are often followed by substantial reductions in tax collections and defaults on sovereign debt.
Motivated by this findings and some of the results in this paper we speculate in what follows on an additional channel through which higher exante leverage buildups possibly makes the economy more crisis prone when new information arrives. Higher leverage raises the probability as well as the magnitude of potential defaults, and with it the cost of potential bailouts. The more costly is a bailout to taxpayers the more reluctant is government to engage in such bailouts. As a consequence, the higher is leverage, the higher bailout uncertainty making beliefs more sensitive to news.
The upshot is that the sensitivity of expectations to various news becomes larger the larger is leverage. In terms of the multiple priors framework this means that the range of bailout probability distributions entertained by individuals becomes more sensitive to news. As a consequence, the same pessimistic new information about the likelihood of bailout is more likely to puncture a bubble the higher is leverage.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: For regular borrowers, and given r B2 = r e B2 , the condition in Equation (4) is identical to the condition in Equation (3). But, by assumption 1a, the last condition is satisfied for all L B ≥ 0. Hence, regular borrowers are solvent at any level of leverage. Since 2yq > 2y (2q − 1) this is afortiori true for lucky borrowers. The proof for unlucky borrowers follows by using Equation (5) 
Proof of Proposition 1:
The first two default probabilities follow directly from Lemmas 1 through 3. The third probability is derived by noting that, when leverage is larger than L 1 B default may occur in period 1 if the borrower turns out to be unlucky (probability θ U B ) and may also occur in period 2 if he turns out to be a regular borrower and Y P = −2y (probability (1 − θ)(1 − q) 2 ). The last probability follows by noting that, in addition to the states in which he defaults in the previous case, the borrower defaults also in the following two cases: (i) If he is a LB and there is a contraction, (ii)
If he is a regular borrower in and Y P = 0. QED
Proof of Proposition 2:
To show that L H B is the optimal level of leverage it suffices to establish that
The proof is implemented by using Equation (12) to form explicit expressions for the differences
and by showing that they are all positive.
Assumption 1 and q sufficiently close to one imply that this difference is positive.
> 0 this expression is positive for q sufficiently close to one.
(iii) Letting θ LB approach q from below and θ U B approach zero from above
.
> 0 this expression is positive for q sufficiently close to one. (ii) and (iii) are needed to rule out the possibility that optimal leverage is at L c F or at zero. To derive 32 As elaborated later in the general equilibrium section, the equality sign is allowed to accommodate a special case in which, due to full diversification, lenders face no risk in period 0.
Then necessary conditions for the optimal level of leverage to be above
Conditions (i) and (ii) are obtained by using equations (13) and (16) to express F's utility in terms of the appropriate levels of leverage, substituting the resulting expression into Equation (39) and by rearranging. To complete the proof it remains to show that, when (γ 2t /γ 1t ) is sufficiently small,
is small the only two terms that could potentially make 
where u (·) stands for the utility function. The first order condition implies
Taking a Taylor approximation of the marginal utility with respect to
For a sufficiently small risk premium
but for constant absolute risk aversion, u (x) = −e −αx , the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is
. QED
Proof of Proposition 10: Part (i) follows immediately form Equation (22).
Part (ii) The first derivative of V ar
which is negative since p, q ∈ [0, 1] are probabilities.
Part (iii) follows immediately form Equation (22). QED
Proof of Proposition 11: Writing Equation (27) as
where λ 1 and λ 2 are defined by equations (22) and (23), respectively. Differentiating y with respect
Since it is a probability λ 1 ∈ [0, , 1]. Hence, the derivative is positive for 2(1+r f )−λ1
QED
Proof of Proposition 12 : Part (i) is an immediate consequence of proposition 10.
Part (ii): Differentiating equations (33) and (34) totally with respect to π yields
(
Solving this two equations system for are both positive.
Utilization of those sign restrictions in equations (42) and (43) 
which is equivalent to 
Rearrangement of this inequality reveals that it is equivalent to the condition in part (ii) of the proposition establishing that RB default. Given that RB default under r B2 UB default afortiori.
Part (iv) When r B2 increases sufficiently beyond the bound in part (ii) even LB are denied access to credit inducing a total drying up of refinancing to borrowers. QED Proof of proposition 13 : Part (i): The banking spread in period 2 is
Differentiating the spread totally with respect to π 1
where the second equality follows by using equations (42) . Hence an increase in bailout uncertainty (a decrease in π 1 ) raises the spread in the first case and reduces it in the second. implying, by part (i), that an increase in bailout uncertainty raises the banking spread.
Proof of proposition 14: The 3 equations system in (30), (31) and (32) .
Equation (37) 
Under the conditions of the proposition the term in curly parenthesis on the right hand side of this equation is larger than one. Consequently, when δ tends to zero from above 
